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#ClientSideScanning

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"Billions of people worldwide use private messaging platforms like Signal, WhatsApp, and iMessage to communicate securely. This is possible thanks to end-to-end encryption (E2EE), which ensures that only the sender and the intended recipient(s) can view the contents of a message, with no access possible for any third party, not even the service provider itself. Despite the widespread adoption of E2EE apps, including by government officials, and the role of encryption in safeguarding human rights, encryption, which can be lifesaving, is under attack around the world. These attacks most often come in the form of client-side scanning (CSS), which is already being pushed in the EU, UK, U.S., and Australia.

CSS involves scanning the photos, videos, and messages on an individual’s device against a database of known objectionable material, before the content is then sent onwards via an encrypted messaging platform. Before an individual uploads a file to an encrypted messaging window, it would be converted into a digital fingerprint, or “hash,” and compared against a database of digital fingerprints of prohibited material. Such a database could be housed on a person’s device, or at the server level.

Proponents of CSS argue that it is a privacy-respecting method of checking content in the interests of online safety, but as we explain in this FAQ piece, CSS undermines the privacy and security enabled by E2EE platforms. It is at odds with the principles of necessity and proportionality, and its implementation would erode the trustworthiness of E2EE channels; the most crucial tool we have for communicating securely and privately in a digital ecosystem dominated by trigger-happy surveillance."

accessnow.org/why-client-side-

Access Now · Why client-side scanning is a lose-lose propositionClient-side scanning (CSS) on encrypted platforms undermines people’s privacy and security by circumventing end-to-end encryption (E2EE).

IN CASE YOU MISSED IT: aren’t you glad that we don’t (yet) live in a world where on-device client side surveillance triggers report you to the police for using words like “bomb” or “uranium” in Signal & WhatsApp chats?

If such things did exist they would currently be swamped by people discussing global news:

Exclusive: Early US intel assessment suggests strikes on Iran did not destroy nuclear sites, sources say

https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/24/politics/intel-assessment-us-strikes-iran-nuclear-sites

CNN · Exclusive: Early US intel assessment suggests strikes on Iran did not destroy nuclear sites, sources sayBy Natasha Bertrand

Let’s all take a moment to consider that if — as demanded by Ofcom — encrypted messenger systems WERE actually monitoring conversations for words like: drone, bomb, explosive… all reports would currently be swamped

I don’t know about you but I have several WhatsApp and Signal chats which are currently burning with discussion of how war has changed and what battle risks are inherent in new technology.

Should that all be censored in pursuit of keeping us safe from terrorists?

Dienstag 11.03. steht die #Chatkontrolle wieder auf der Tagesordnung der Ratsarbeitsgruppe Strafverfolgung. Der polnische Vorsitz im Rat hat Ende Januar einen Vorschlag gemacht bei dem #ClientSideScanning für Unternehmen nicht mehr verpflichtend wäre.

Aber: Unternehmen dürften freiwillig private Nachrichten scannen und werden dazu auch angehalten, außerdem Pflicht zu technischen Alterskontrollen.

@edri gibt einen Überblick und schaut in die 🔮 wie es weiter gehen könnte:
edri.org/our-work/poland-searc

European Digital Rights (EDRi)Poland searches for silver bullet for CSA Regulation - European Digital Rights (EDRi)Read EDRi's analysis of the Polish Council Presidency attempts to break the deadlock on the controversial Chat Control proposal.

ChatControl in Duitsland: NetzPolitik

Duitstalig: netzpolitik.org/2025/geheimer-.

Voor de medelanders die minder goed zijn in Duits (werkt in Chrome, andere browsers mogelijk niet), een matige vertaling (door Google van DE naar NL): netzpolitik-org.translate.goog.

Matig, want ondanks de belachelijke AI-hype: met stomme fouten. Zoals "Deutsche Polizeibehörden lassen weiterhin Bilder und Videos bewusst im Netz" dat Google vertaalt in "De Duitse politie blijft opzettelijk foto's en video's online plaatsen".

Tip als u zelf een vertaallink wilt maken:
• Open translate.google.com/?sl=nl&tl
• Wijzig zonodig bron/doel-talen
• Vul de URL in (of kopieer/plak)
• Druk op (->)

Nu kunt u de link uit de adresbalk kopiëren (waarom dat een naar phishing stinkende "translate.goog" link wordt, ontgaat ook mij).

Mijn bron voor die NetzPolitik pagina: "linuzifer" (@linuzifer) in 23.social/@linuzifer/113962088.

netzpolitik.org · Geheimer Beschluss: Pädokriminelle Inhalte bleiben trotz Kenntnis der Polizei im NetzVor mehr als drei Jahren wurde bekannt, dass Polizeibehörden pädokriminelle Inhalte kaum melden und entfernen. Die Politik gelobte damals Besserung - und entschied sich geheim anders. Dabei wäre die Löschung einfach und wirkungsvoll, zeigt jetzt eine Recherche von Panorama und STRG_F.
Continued thread

A few folks are questioning if AI scanning like what Android is doing can be missused. The last time a similar feature was coming to Apple's iOS the media rightly described it as an extremely dangerous warrantless surveillance tool.

Regardless of what Android developers intended this client side scanner to do it will be enlisted by governments of the world to spy on you and break strong encryption.

9to5mac.com/2023/09/01/csam-sc

#ChatControl proposal failed in the Council of the EU again today! 🎉

Hungary tried to use its presidency to shame critical governments into agreeing to the proposed mass surveillance by forcing ministers to explain themselves during live-streamed public session. This plan backfired:
several countries took the floor to confirm on the record that this would undermine #cybersecurity, attack #encryption with #ClientSideScanning and violate fundamental rights!
video.consilium.europa.eu/even
#StopScanningMe