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#standardization

1 post1 participant0 posts today

You know I'm down with that #RISCV movement - to free the #firmware and free the #hardware. It is mui importante.

But fragmentation in the #computer world, (particularly in #opensource #desktop and #consumer standards) has the effect of making things worse.

#Standardization is key, in both #software - and #hardware.

Also, what the heck is bit switching?

From Linus Torvalds <>
Date Tue, 30 Sep 2025 16:53:24 -0700
Subject Re: [GIT PULL] RISC-V updates for v6.18-rc1
lkml.org/lkml/2025/9/30/1304

lkml.orgLKML: Linus Torvalds: Re: [GIT PULL] RISC-V updates for v6.18-rc1
Replied in thread

@r @fluffykittycat @flower Obviously people have used the #RP2040 for many projects and given it's ease of programming, low price, excellent documentation and easy availability it's no wounder it does put pressue on #ATmega / #ATtiny, #Arduino, #Teensy, etc.

  • At least for low volume productions and prototypes as proof of concept.

#RaspberryPi shure are more and more targeting #embedded & #industrial clients given they do in fact disrupt the market as one can get proper #documentation and #tools without paying $$$$ upfront (AND sign NDAs) just to be able to boot #Linux on it.

  • And competitors fail at understanding that this makes #Broadcom look good and is their entry-way into acquiring new clients. Because selling hardware purely off specs may work in #amd64 land where shit's legacy and the way things work is so entrenched that basic stuff just works as in booting. #ARM and even #ARM64 fail at having that level of #standardization.

OFC the #Pi0 / #Pi0W / #Pi0W2 doesn't need to innovate since every competitor isn't even trying to compete but merely farting out boards with 0 documentation and some halfassed boot images and no post-sales support so they keep dominating by virtue of being the only ones that just work...

The journey to standardized metric threads began in the 19th century with Professor Marc Thury’s Thury thread, designed for Swiss watchmaking. By 1947, post-war collaboration led to the ISO metric thread standard, harmonizing global engineering practices. Today, metric threads power industries worldwide, from automotive to aerospace. Pioneers like Thury and the ISO standard show how innovation and collaboration create lasting solutions. #MetricThreads #Engineering #Standardization

🗓️ Tomorrow 17 July at 4pm CET! Register to the @w3c @wot online meetup "An #OpenSource software stack for #IoT virtualization and convergence with #EdgeComputing technologies"

▶️ w3.org/events/meetings/d5ca808

The implementation of VOStack is aligned with the Web of Things specifications and is implemented in the framework of the NEPHELE Horizon EU project. #standardization

Slides: nephele-project.eu/sites/nephe

cc @ege @hipeac @EclipseFdn

Excited to announce that our paper with TU Wien on the first plaintext recovery attack against XCB-AES (IEEE 1619.2) has been accepted at #CRYPTO2025!
👉 ia.cr/2024/1554
#IEEE #Standardization #XCB #XCB_AES #cosic #kuleuven

IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Breaking the IEEE Encryption Standard – XCB-AES in Two QueriesTweakable enciphering modes (TEMs) provide security in various storage and space-critical applications, including disk and file-based encryption and packet-based communication protocols. XCB-AES (originally introduced as XCBv2) is specified in the IEEE 1619.2 standard for encryption of sector-oriented storage media and comes with a formal security proof for block-aligned messages. In this work, we present the first plaintext recovery attack on XCB-AES $-$ the shared difference attack, demonstrating that the security of XCB-AES is fundamentally flawed. Our plaintext recovery attack is highly efficient and requires only two queries (one enciphering and one deciphering), breaking the claimed $\mathsf{vil\text{-}stprp}$, $\mathsf{stprp}$ as well as the basic $\mathsf{sprp}$ security. Our shared difference attack exploits an inherent property of polynomial hash functions called separability. We pinpoint the exact flaw in the security proof of XCB-AES, which arises from the separability of polynomial hash functions. We show that this vulnerability in the XCB design strategy has gone unnoticed for over 20 years and has been inadvertently replicated in many XCB-style TEM designs, including the IEEE 1619.2 standard XCB-AES. We also apply the shared difference attack to other TEMs based on XCB $-$ XCBv1, HCI, and MXCB, invalidating all of their security claims, and discuss some immediate countermeasures. Our findings are the first to highlight the need to reassess the present IEEE 1619.2 standard as well as the security and potential deployments of XCB-style TEMs.