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#threatmodel

2 posts2 participants0 posts today
Mr. Tux

Meine Datenschutz und Privatsphäre Übersicht 2025, für alle 🔐 :mastodon:

als PDF Datei:

cryptpad.digitalcourage.de/fil

#DSGVO #TDDDG #unplugtrump
#Datenschutz #Privatsphäre #sicherheit #Verschlüsselung #Adguard
#encryption #WEtell #SoloKey #NitroKey #Email #Cybersecurity #Pixelfed #Massenűberwachung #Leta
#Google #Metadaten #WhatsApp #Threema #Cryptpad #Signal
#Hateaid #Cyberstalking #Messenger #Browser #Youtube #NewPipe #Chatkontrolle #nichtszuverbergen #ÜberwachungsKapitalismus #Microsoft #Apple #Windows10 #Linux #Matrix #Mastodon #Friendica #Fediverse #Mastodir #Loops #2FA #Ransomware #Foss #VeraCrypt #HateAid #Coreboot #Volksverpetzer #Netzpolitik #endof10 #OpenAndroidInstaller #Nobara
#Digitalisierung #FragdenStaat #Shiftphone  #OpenSource #GrapheneOS #CCC #Mail #Mullvad #PGP #GnuPG #DNS #Gaming #linuxgaming #Lutris #Protondb #eOS #Enshittification
#Bloatware #TPM #Murena  #LiberaPay #GnuTaler #Taler #PreppingforFuture
#FediLZ #BlueLZ #InstaLZ #ThreatModel
#FLOSS #UEFI #Medienkompetenz

MidniteMikeWrites

I just realized I've been building a "threat model" of capitalism, informed by the idea that market systems are open networks that depend on trust. Kind of happy that I've somehow got my passion for cybersecurity and political philosophy to synergize so well.

My latest writing has me explore "four paradoxes" of capitalism which define the threat landscape for abuse in the system. misaligned.markets/tension-mar

Misaligned Markets · The tension at the heart of market capitalismCapitalism promises competition, but its biggest winners avoid it. Separating markets from capitalism can explain.
#infosec#threatmodel#capitalism
Bi—zaar

#FediHelp
I need to talk with someone skilled about #threatModel (digital side) specifically about 'downloads' / archiving / wget (mirroring) and online/offline for field activities (logistics / investigation ) and activist groups (water, mud, soil investigation within sampling and DIY analysis & data production)

I need to talk so do not point me any NGOs (I already now them). And I've been there too.

It's about holistic security approach in this very specific nudge.
Downloading things, offline access first, sharing (see Kiwix and kiwix itw at APC.org)
Being up to a mountain or down to a river or sewers system or so.
Or around floods in streets / towns / cities / lands.
Radio (SDR) scanning in the field and emergency data transmission / copy.

If it's not a clear and not understandable claim, I'm so sorry and please feel free to bake he with your asking and thoughts.

Very very important: carbon-mascu-male alpha-stupid-surviving-boyz are not welcome in this discussion and I'm sure you get the point my dear fedizens (no techbro / no cryptobro and more away)

cc @DigiDefenders @rysiek @onepict
@APC
@iffybooks @hackstub @lacontrevoie

Paco Hope #resist

Looking at some #AI generated #threatmodel output and it listed stealing a user's credentials and using them in the "Spoofing" category. I was uncertain. Is that spoofing or elevation of privilege. So I wander over to a #microsoft page on #stride.

They say it's spoofing, which is fine. It's reasonable. I don't care as long as we all agree.

But in that table, that's literally the only example of spoofing. There are a LOT of other kinds of things that could be called spoofing. If you're gonna have only one example of spoofing, I don't think stealing credentials is the best example.

learn.microsoft.comThreats - Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool - AzureThreat category page for the Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool, containing categories for all exposed generated threats.
#microsoft#stride
Continued thread
Paco Hope #resist

Lastly, there's the training data. I work for #AWS (so these are strictly my personal opinions). We are opinionated about the platform. We think that there are things you should do and things you shouldn't. If you have deep knowledge of anything (Microsoft, Google, NodeJS, SAP, whatever) you will have informed opinions.

The threat models that I have seen, that use general purpose models like Claude Sonnet, include advice that I think is stupid because I am opinionated about the platform. There's training data about AWS in the model that was authored by not-AWS. And there's training data in the model that was authored by AWS. The former massively outweighs the latter in a general-purpose, trained-on-the-Internet model.

So internal users (who are expected to do things the AWS way) are getting threats that (a) don't match our way of working, and (b) they can't mitigate anyway. Like I saw an AI-generated threat of brute-forcing a cognito token. While the possiblity of that happening (much like buying a winning lottery ticket) is non-zero, that is not a threat that a software developer can mitigate. There's nothing you can do in your application stack to prevent, detect, or respond to that. You're accepting that risk, like it or not, and I think we're wasting brain cells and disk sectors thinking about it and writing it down.

The other one I hate is when it tells you to encrypt your data at rest in S3. Try not to. There's no action for you to take. The thing you control is which key does it and who can use that key.

So if you have an area of expertise, the majority of the training data in any consumer model is worse than your knowledge. It is going to generate threats and risks that will irritate you.

4/fin

#AI#AppSec#ThreatModel
Continued thread
Paco Hope #resist

Threat models evolve over time, the same as your software does. Nobody is building a save/load feature into their AI powered threat model. Getting deterministic output from consumer-grade LLMs is not a given. So even if you DO create save/reload capability, it's imperfect.

All the tools I've seen start every session from a blank sheet of paper. So If you're revisiting an app that you threat modeled before, because you want to update your model, you're going to start from scratch.

3/n

#AI#AppSec#ThreatModel
Continued thread
Paco Hope #resist

Related to this, nobody seems to account for the fact that LLMs bullshit sometimes. If you pin someone down and say "the user of your AI-powered threat modeller: do they know how to do a threat model without AI?" Many people will say "yes." Because to say "no" is to admit that the people will be blindly following LLM output that might be total bullshit.

The goal, however, of many of these systems is to make threat modeling more accessible to people who don't know how to do it. To do that, though, you'd have to be more skeptical about your user, and spend some time educating them. Otherwise, they leave the process no smarter than they began.

Honestly, I think a lot of people think the threat model is going to be done entirely by the AI and they want to build a system where the human just consumes and uses it.

2/n

#AI#AppSec#ThreatModel
Paco Hope #resist

I have seen a lot of efforts to use an #LLM to create a #ThreatModel. I have some insights.

Attempts at #AI #ThreatModeling tend to do 3 things wrong:

  1. They assume that the user's input is both complete and correct. The LLM (in the implementations I've seen) never questions "are you sure?" and it never prompts the user like "you haven't told me X, what about X?"
  2. Lots of teams treat a threat model as a deliverable. Like we go build our code, get ready to ship, and then "oh, shit! Security wants a threat model. Quick, go make one." So it's not this thing that informs any development choices during development. It's an afterthought that gets built just prior to #AppSec review.
  3. Lots of people think you can do an adequate threat model with only technical artifacts (code, architectuer, data flow, documentation, etc.). There's business context that needs to be part of every decision, and teams are just ignoring that.

1/n

Continued thread
Emory

but seriously would #Crowdstrike's lawyers come after me if i publish findings from a public threat model where i might write up findings for airlines and hotels for lacking vendor diversity and failing open on connected systems (e.g. you could book and pay for hotels that were offline, but Bookings.com and some others didn't give a fuck and sent people to hotels not expecting them for days?)

another finding for not having a plan or procedure. etc.

#threatmodel#ideas#publicService
Mr. Tux

Meine Datenschutz und Privatsphäre Übersicht 2025, für Jedermann 🔐

Teilen er­be­ten ‼️ :BoostOK:

als PDF:

cryptpad.digitalcourage.de/fil

 #DSGVO #TDDDG ( #unplugtrump )
#Datenschutz #Privatsphäre #sicherheit #Verschlüsselung
#encryption #WEtell #SoloKey #NitroKey #Email #Cybersecurity #Pixelfed #Massenűberwachung
#Google #Metadaten #WhatsApp #Threema #Cryptpad #Signal
#Hateaid #Cyberstalking #Messenger #Browser #Youtube #NewPipe #Chatkontrolle #nichtszuverbergen #ÜberwachungsKapitalismus #Microsoft #Apple #Windows #Linux #Matrix #Mastodon #Friendica #Fediverse #Mastodir #Loops #2FA #Ransomware #Foss #VeraCrypt #HateAid #Coreboot #Volksverpetzer #Netzpolitik #Digitalisierung #FragdenStaat #Shiftphone  #OpenSource #GrapheneOS #CCC #Mail #Mullvad #PGP #GnuPG #DNS #Gaming #linuxgaming #Lutris #Protondb #eOS #Enshittification
#Bloatware #TPM #Murena  #LiberaPay #GnuTaler #Taler #PreppingforFuture
#FediLZ #BlueLZ #InstaLZ #ThreatModel
#FLOSS #UEFI #Medienkompetenz

frox

The #encryption topic in #InstantMesaging is popular again recently. As usual there's a lot of misunderstanding and little discussion of a #ThreatModel when giving recommendations.
If the private key is backed up with Apple or Google from your phone, then your messages may as well not be encrypted 🙈 I've again seen this indirectly with contacts changing phones and their keys are the same as on their old device. Due to automatic backups I guess.
Doesn't matter if it's #WhatsApp, #Signal or #XMPP

*
Multi Purr Puss :verified:

Here, in .de, we tend to have cellars (basements), subterranean storage closets; that's where i keep my "Off-Site" #backup.

I know, i know; I deem it good enough, for my personal #HomeLab #ThreatModel - i'm not keeping billable customer data safe. 😉

#Privacy is taken care of inside the VMs - #LUKS inside the VM - makes things more convenient - all the NAS/VM host knows is text/plain ZVOLs - helps with quick (non-interactive) reboots.

Paco Hope #resist

Some of my colleagues at #AWS have created an open-source serverless #AI assisted #threatmodel solution. You upload architecture diagrams to it, and it uses Claude Sonnet via Amazon Bedrock to analyze it.

I'm not too impressed with the threats it comes up with. But I am very impressed with the amount of typing it saves. Given nothing more than a picture and about 2 minutes of computation, it spits out a very good list of what is depicted in the diagram and the flows between them. To the extent that the diagram is accurate/well-labeled, this solution seems to do a very good job writing out what is depicted.

I deployed this "Threat Designer" app. Then I took the architecture image from this blog post and dropped that picture into it. The image analysis produced some of the list of things you see attached.

This is a specialized, context-aware kind of OCR. I was impressed at boundaries, flows, and assets pulled from a graphic. Could save a lot of typing time. I was not impressed with the threats it identifies. Having said that, it did identify a handful of things I hadn't thought of before, like EventBridge event injection. But the majority of the threats are low value.

I suspect this app is not cheap to run. So caveat deployor.
#cloud #cloudsecurity #appsec #threatmodeling

#ai#threatmodel
Emory

> When doing threat modeling from here on out, it is now unfortunately important to consider the question "Am I a moron?"

derisking morons is something i do for a living if anyone is hiring for that. i also turn software engineers into security and privacy resources. triple multiplier right here 🖐️

#infosec #threatModel #morons
apple.news/Ay6s_pSlzRrGicmqMVS

apple.newsWhen Your Threat Model Is Being a Moron — 404 MediaNo phone, no app, no encryption can protect you from yourself if you send the information you’re trying to hide directly to someone you don’t want to have it. One of the most basic tenets of cybersecurity is that you must “consider your threat model” when trying to keep your data and your communications safe, and then take appropriate steps to protect yourself. This means you need to consider who you are, what you are talking about, and who may want to know that information (potential
arutaz
I don't feel good mentally, and most of that is because of my obsession with privacy and security.

I have never done any threat modeling, but instead wanted to hide everything, from everyone, all the time.

This is certainly not something I need, and it's very exhausting to try to live like that.

So now I have actually done threat modeling, and I hope and think, that this will easy my mind, and my life.

#Privacy #Security #Health #MentalHealth #ThreatModel #ThreatModeling #Serenity #PeaceOfMind
#PeaceOfMind
9x0rg

> You and your team should incrementally update your threat model as your system changes, integrating threat modeling into each phase of your SDLC to create a Threat and Risk Analysis Informed Lifecycle (TRAIL). Here, we cover how to do that: how to further tailor the threat model we built, how to maintain it, when to update it as development continues, and how to make use of it.

**Continuous TRAIL - The Trail of Bits Blog**

blog.trailofbits.com/2025/03/0

The Trail of Bits Blog · Continuous TRAILYou and your team should incrementally update your threat model as your system changes, integrating threat modeling into each phase of your SDLC to create a Threat and Risk Analysis Informed Lifecycle (TRAIL). Here, we cover how to do that: how to further tailor the threat model we built, how to maintain it, when to update it as development continues, and how to make use of it.
#CyberSecurity#ThreatModel
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